Mobile · firmware · hardware

Security services for systems that have to trust hostile devices.

ByteBack works on mobile device trust, firmware, and hardware. Most projects start with a specific trust decision and end with testing on real devices.

Trust decision / 01 Evidence attached
01
Measured cleanEvidence supports the policy
02
Measured adverseEvidence contradicts the policy
03
UnavailableNot measured is not a pass

If a signal cannot be collected, that is different from a clean result. The system should say so.

Security services

Three areas of work.

Most projects begin with one question: what can the product safely trust about a phone or embedded device?

01

Mobile and backend

Device trust & attestation

Architecture and implementation for products whose servers must decide whether to believe a phone or the software running on it.

  • Mobile threat models and trust boundaries
  • Hardware-backed attestation policy
  • Server-authoritative decision systems
  • Clean, adverse, and unavailable states
See engagement shapes
02

Boards, boot chains, and TEEs

Hardware & firmware security

Security review and testing below the operating-system boundary, from board behavior through the boot chain.

  • Secure boot and firmware integrity
  • TEE and secure-element boundaries
  • Fault injection and side channels
  • Exploit reproduction and mitigation
Discuss the hardware
03

Specialist recovery service

Hardware wallet recovery

A narrow application of the same hardware practice: invasive key-material recovery on supported Trezor devices.

  • Ownership verified before bench work
  • No custody or movement of funds
  • Documented chain of custody
  • Feasibility stated before an attempt
Read the recovery policy

How the work is done

Start with the decision.

Write down what the system needs to know, how an attacker could lie about it, and what evidence is actually available.

01 / THREAT MODEL

Define the trust decision.

Document the attack paths, failure states, and consequences before choosing controls.

02 / ENGINEERING

Build or review the control.

Keep policy on the server, make the device return evidence, and represent missing signals honestly.

03 / TEST

Try to bypass it.

Test the actual implementation on real devices and record the result, including the gaps.

Experience

Relevant work.

Fifteen years in mobile security, payment hardware, firmware, secure boot, attestation, and vulnerability research.

Embedded card-reader security

Named inventor on a U.S. patent for keeping card numbers and PIN entry apart. One design removes PAN data from the merchant device before requesting a PIN. Another separates them across trusted execution environments and payment components.

Product security

Mobile threat signals and payment hardware at Square, mobile red-team work at Visa, and low-level security work at Root Labs and SourceDNA, later acquired by Apple.

Firmware research

Independently found and fully exploited a pre-auth U-Boot NFS client overflow. The finding collided with a private report filed one month earlier; patches and the public exploit chain are upstream.

Hardware wallets

Voltage fault injection against STM32F2 read-out protection, with key-material extraction from Trezor One and Model T.

How engagements work

Typical engagements.

The exact scope depends on whether you need a design review, implementation help, or repeated testing.

About

ByteBack is run by Manizzle.

Manizzle has spent fifteen years working on mobile security, payment hardware, firmware, and the systems that decide whether to trust a device.

This is a small practice. Manizzle scopes the work and does the engineering.

Contact

Tell me what the system needs to trust.

On Signal, send a short description of the product, the devices in scope, and the decision you are trying to make.

Continue on Signal